Abstract Complex equality -some notes on redistribution in South Africa
Stating the problem
Michael Walzer defends a system o f "complex equality" which has significance for attempts in S.A. to distribute social goods (including, and particularly income and wealth) equitably and fairly. Complex equality is a political dispensation governing the distribution o f social goods in differentiated societies (i.e. societies which produce and distribute a large variety o f social goods in accordance with culturally determined patterns o f distribution). Complex equality is characterized by a strict equality o f access to the social goods o f all spheres o f society (moral and material) -an equality which is maintained alongside different patterns o f distribution for each sphere. This dispensation is designed to resist domination. To understand Walzer's concept o f domination w e begin by accepting his distinction between monopoly and dominance. When someone or some group has a monopoly, they have control over the production and distribution o f some social good. Dominance results when those who hold a monopoly use their control over the social good in question to gain control over other social goods. So, for instance, anyone who holds a monopoly o f state power could use this position to gain control over the means o f production. Walzer believes that m onopolies are in themselves not unjust; it is only when m onopolies are used to aspire to positions o f dominance that unjust distributions arise. Under a system o f complex equality, m onopolies could grow within spheres, but no one could convert a monopoly in one sphere into control over the social goods o f another sphere. But since the distribution o f one social good will affect another in another sphere, there can, in practice, only be relative autonomy for spheres -but even relative autonomy is, for Walzer, a critical principle o f com plex equality.
• A sphere is absolutely autonomous only when the distributive pattern o f other spheres do not impinge upon it; a sphere is relatively autonomous only when an agent's monopoly in one sphere does not give her a monopoly in another sphere (i.e. seepage and interpenetration between spheres do in fact occur, though this does not give any individual cross-boundary advantages).
Walzer thinks that m onopolies cannot be prevented though dominance can. Systems o f "simple equality", which recognize an equality o f regard and/or outcome in various ways as the principles o f fair distribution in all spheres o f social life, attempt to deal with monopolies by outlawing them -a move Walzer views as profoundly self-defeating. Rather than attacking monopoly, thinks Walzer, we should devise a social system which resists dominance. Now, in South Africa a problem o f domination had manifested itself during the apartheid era. The white sector o f the population had thrived economically in part because they had control over the political sphere o f social life. And this situation has given them competitive advantage over other people in the current market. As I read Walzer, this historically gained advantage is unjust because it is due to boundary crossings between spheres, and to an exclusive admissions policy with regard to membership o f the 'South African' community. Wealth gained because o f these things should be the subject o f redistribution, especially since the white sector o f the population still controls the greater share o f the nation's wealth.
I shall attempt to indicate that Walzer offers reasons why a redistribution should be carried out. According to Walzer historically gained advantages are unjust if due to exclusionary membership policies. As I shall attempt to show, the normative dimension o f membership, taken together with an attempt to structure society in a way which resists domination -particularly through the prohibition on boundary crossings between spheres -require a redesign o f society if advantages were accumulated because o f domination. I shall attempt to exploit these points in making a case for redistribution.
W alzer's theory
Walzer defends a form o f communitarian pluralism. He attempts to reinteipret notions o f freedom and equality in an effort to construct a theory o f distribution suitable for multi-cultural societies (though he particularly has the U SA in mind). His attempt at reinterpretation centres in three significant features o f his political theory:
• In practice liberty and equality are best defended by separating the political sphere o f social life from all other spheres, in particular the economic sphere, and
• recognizing that each sphere has its own pattern or principle o f distribution which conforms to the shared understandings o f the political community w ith in which the pattern is manifest;
• each sphere functions autonomously, but the political sphere has an umbrella function -it has to ensure that no distributive transgressions take place between spheres (eg. the fact that you are rich and I am poor does not give you any competitive advantage if both o f us are running for public office).
Domination in social life is best combatted by maintaining the autonomy o f each
sphere o f distribution -by preventing those who have great economic power from acquiring political power because they have economic clout, and vice versa; or by preventing those who have religious power from obtaining control over the sphere o f education because they have influence in the sphere o f religion. Since the boundaries between spheres reflect a cultural bias (where they are drawn may vary from society to society), the account o f justice which Walzer presents is ultimately a cultural account.
First principles and starting point
Particularism and pluralism • the principles o f justice (for the U SA and other differentiated societies) must be pluralistic:
D ifferent social goods ought to be distributed, for different reasons, in accordance w ith different procedures, by different agents; and ... all these differences derive from different understandings o f the social goods them selves -the inevitable product o f historical and cultural particularism (W alzer, 1983:6 ).
• pluralism must be protected -nobody should be allowed to convert a monopoly o f one social good into control o f another i.e. nobody should be allowed a position o f dominance. Walzer expresses this in the form o f a principle:
N o social good x should be distributed to m en and w om en w ho possess some other good y m erely because they possess y and w ithout regard to the m eaning o f x (W alzer, 1983:20) .
Walzer underwrites the idea o f a "pluralist" community which requires structures that unite all member communities by institutional bonds. In Walzer's sense the good society is one in which a variety o f members (or partial) communities coexist in a form o f parallelism, all enjoying equal recognition, (constitutionally) guaranteed. The good community is more than just an association o f member groups, for they share an understanding o f what is public (o f concern to all members) and what is private (o f concern to particular member groups) within a broad constitutional framework. This conforms to a basic principle o f political community: it is the understanding people share that makes them into a community and not just an association. The understanding they share -in the "pluralist" sense -is that there are matters o f public concern about which consensus must be established before any line o f political action can become possible. The roots o f political community is implicit in this idea: there are issues which anyone can legitimately take an interest in -to the point o f censuring state conduct -and this concerns the maintenance o f the separation between public and private, and the confinement o f state authority to the former. The line separating the domains will -in any democratic society -be open to negotiation in a public forum o f debate. So where the line is drawn is to a large extent a function o f cultural particularism. 
Shared understandings and common life

A comprehensive theory of society
The drive towards universality is especially encouraged by Walzer's reliance on a comprehensive theory o f society. Critical standards aspire to universality -yet they are in fact the product o f particularity. Critical standards are made available by the shared meanings o f the community. This means that whenever a dissenter criticises a particular social practice, she is protesting in the name o f the community itself (because it is unfaithful to its own self-understanding). She is appealing to a different interpretation o f the meaning o f the practice -which interpretation may arise within the culture o f the community itself (immanent criticism), or may be borrowed from another culture (trans-acculturation). Substantive differences between interpretations o f the common good are encouraged by a culture o f dialogue, but no appeal beyond the community itself can establish which interpretation will become dominant: that is a matter for the members themselves to decide. 
The common life as standard of judgement
Redistributing social goods in contemporary South Africa
We must bear in mind Walzer's avowed aim to formulate principles o f distribution which can be used to criticize practice, should practice be at variance with self understanding. Bearing in mind that different societies have different lists o f basic or primary goods, the distributive principles currently operative in South Africa are plural -different principles are recognized for different spheres -though they are not always consistent with current self-understandings. The crucial criterion o f being a group, and thus qualifying for group rights, is "a group-constituting understanding" (McDonald, 1991:219). Such an understanding is paradigmatically correlated to features like a shared heritage, language, belief, and social condition. People oppressed because o f their ethnicity, race, or language provide a focus for a shared understanding. Deborah James (1997:123) observes in this regard that "experiences o f domination and resistance in the colonial and apartheid eras ... have served as a basis for local identity-building in the present day". Let us call a group which has a "group-constituting understanding" an identifying community. Allegiance to an identifying community structures personal identity (at least, and minimally, partially) yielding content-fiill selves. In h ig h ly pluralistic contexts (for instance, South Africa), the self-identification o f contentfull selves is non-voluntary and unchosen, at least initially -w e identify with the identifying communities into which w e are bom. Voluntary identification comes later (the consequence, no doubt, o f trans-acculturation), once w e have acquired the necessary critical tools to make informed choices.
Recognition of difference in South Africa
As indicated above, with collective rights the community is the right-holder, which means that the community has moral standing, it defines the moral point o f view in respect o f rights pertaining to language and education. We should here distinguish between two separate moral contexts: the first is defined by a group-constituting understanding that makes an association into a community; the second is defined by the larger, pluralistic context in which one community stands as right-holder vis-á-vis another. In this second context collective rights pertaining to language and mother-tongue instruction should be equally available, i.e. equality should be the principle o f distribution because this is required by the demand to redistribute recognition. But education is recognized as a needed good, and since rights to it are distributed according to need, historical injustices are corrected by awarding greater shares o f the common wealth to the more needy. This means that former "black" schools in It is true that in dem anding the nationalization o f the banks, the gold m ines, and the land, the C harter strikes a fatal blow at the financial and gold-m ining m onopolies and farm ing interests that have for centuries plundered the country and condem ned its people to servitude. B ut such a step is im perative because the realization o f the C harter is inconceivable, in fact im possible, unless and until these m onopolies are sm ashed and the national w ealth o f the country turned over to the people (M andela, 1995:55) .
But this is a matter o f strategy rather than o f principle. The ANC has "no ideological attachment to nationalization, but it's the only effective way to ensure an equal distribution o f wealth. We say to the business community: if you have a better alternative tell us and if it's effective w e'll abandon nationalization" (McCarton, 1991:11).
Nationalization is a weapon o f the straggle.
The A N C has no blueprint that decrees th at these or o ther assets will be nationalized, o r that such nationalization w ould take this o r the other form . B ut w e do say that this option should also be part o f the ongoing debate, subject to critical analysis as any other and view ed in the context o f the realities o f South A frican society (M andela, 1990:2-63) . In South Africa justification follows lines consistent with Walzer's overall views that "whenever the purpose o f communal provision is to open the way to communal participation, it will make sense to recommend a form o f provision that is the same for all the members" (Walzer, 1983:78) . The common life is a standard by which to judge social practices and communal provision o f the kind in question and, as Downing and Thigpen (1986:463) put it, "bring citizens a heightened sense that they share a common life". In other words -failure to guarantee medical care in proportion to need constitutes evidence that the common life is poorly realized. We might argue that medical care is a social good in itself, and, following Downing and Thigpen (1986:402) maintain that all societies (rich and poor) should distribute this good in proportion to need. The grounds would be that modem medicine is a highly developed good which evolved through increased knowledge and technical competence and that all societies (especially rich, differentiated ones) place a high value on life and health, but this is not how this good is valued in South Africa. C om plex equality m eans that no citizen's standing in one sphere or w ith regard to one social good can be undercut b y his standing in som e other sphere, w ith regard to som e other good. Thus, citizen x m ay be chosen over citizen y for political office, and then the tw o o f them w ill be unequal in the sphere o f politics. B ut they w ill not be unequal generally so long as x 's office gives him no advantages over y in any other sphere -superior m edical care, access to better schools for his children, entrepreneurial opportunities, and so on (W alzer, 1983:19) . 
Other areas of justifiable redistribution
Shared understandings in South Africa
